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UNDUE PROCESS: A FATHER’S PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN
AN EMBRYO AND ITS CLASH WITH CASEY
Anthony Jose Sirven*
Abstract
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the United States
Supreme Court respectively held that it is unconstitutional to require a
mother to seek consent from or to notify the father before she has an
abortion. Fathers thus lost consent and notification rights. However,
courts have recently begun to recognize a property interest in human
embryos. This legal trend—resulting from the widespread use of assisted
reproductive technology—could allow fathers to claim that the abortion
of their unborn children violates the Due Process Clause, which protects
people from being deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”
A conflict thus arises between Casey’s holding and the due process
rights fathers are entitled to in the context of abortion. This Note reviews
cases that have found property and property-like interests in embryos, as
well as due process jurisprudence regarding property interests. This Note
argues that since embryos have been deemed property, fathers have
grounds for challenging abortions as unconstitutional deprivations of
their property interest without “due process of law.” Yet, since due
process rights for fathers in the abortion context would essentially
guarantee the very thing the Casey decision denied fathers, this Note
argues that the Supreme Court should reexamine its holding in Casey to
balance the two conflicting Fourteenth Amendment rights.
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INTRODUCTION
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,1 and later in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 the United States
Supreme Court held that fathers need not consent to, or be notified of, the
abortion of their unborn child. The Court deemed such restrictions an
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion.3 Fathers lost
consent and notification rights ever since. However, courts have recently
begun to recognize property interests in human embryos. This trend could
allow fathers to claim that the abortion of their unborn children violates
the Due Process Clause, which states that no person shall be deprived of
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”4
The legal status of embryos as property would confer upon fathers due
process rights that could protect them from being deprived of their
property via an abortion. Yet, allowing fathers due process rights in the
abortion context conflicts with Casey because it would guarantee fathers
precisely what Casey denies: the right to notice and an opportunity to be
1. 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (striking a spousal consent statute as an impermissible restriction
on abortion rights).
2. 505 U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992) (striking a spousal notification statute as an “undue
burden” on abortion rights).
3. Id. at 895.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. As an aside, the focus of this Note is only on due process
rights that stem from law that regards embryos as property. This Note does not seek here to support
the proposition that embryos should be regarded as property—to the contrary, the Author
maintains embryos should be afforded full personhood status. Nevertheless, the development of
recent case law would seemingly entitle procedural due process protections to fathers who want
to prevent the abortion of their unborn child on the grounds of a property interest.
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heard.5 Therefore, Casey should be reexamined to address this conflict
between two Fourteenth Amendment rights.
This Note argues that fathers living in the post-Casey world may be
entitled to constitutional rights that Casey instructs states to deny. To
demonstrate this conflict, Part I of this Note examines how fathers’ due
process rights in the abortion context would create a tension with the
Casey decision. Part II explains how the widespread use of assisted
reproductive technology has led to case law establishing property
interests in embryos. Part III explains how the Due Process Clause
provides basic procedural rights that protect people from being deprived
of their property unfairly. Lastly, Part IV revisits how granting fathers
due process rights would conflict with Casey and explains why the
Supreme Court should address this tension.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FATHERS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN AN
ABORTION AND CASEY
Fathers’ due process rights in the abortion context are based on laws
that deem human embryos, directly or indirectly, to be property.6
Although human embryos are not typically thought of as property, the
word “property” in the Due Process Clause has been interpreted broadly
to cover proprietary interests that are also not ordinarily thought of as
property. For example, government jobs, a deceased kin’s body parts, and
welfare payments—things not usually understood as property—have
been deemed protected “property” interests under the Due Process
Clause.7 As this Note demonstrates in Parts II and III, a developing body
of case law has deemed embryos property, and wherever a property
interest lies, due process protects it.
In short, the Due Process Clause guarantees individuals certain
substantive and procedural rights. The most basic procedural rights due
process assures are notice and an opportunity to be heard.8 But in the
5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–95; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950) (“[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that
[a] deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”).
6. While many find the characterization of a frozen embryo as property disconcerting,
scholars debate the merits of treating embryos as property, persons, or something in-between. See
Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Proposed State
Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 410–15 (2013) (discussing the various legal
statuses of the frozen embryo).
7. See infra Part III.
8. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313–14; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For
more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first be notified.’” (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863))).
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abortion context, fathers are not—and in fact they cannot be—given that.
Casey and its progeny have deemed any governmental requirement to
provide a father with notice of or to ask for his consent to an abortion as
being an unconstitutional undue burden.9 Therefore, after Casey, state
actors, such as public medical facilities—and, more generally, state laws
that adhere to Casey’s repudiation of fathers’ notice rights—participate
in a system that deprives fathers of a property interest without affording
them due process before their unborn child in the embryonic stage of life
is aborted.10
It is clear then that recognizing a father’s due process right in the
abortion context would conflict with some aspects of a mother’s abortion
right under Casey; namely, requiring that fathers be notified before an
abortion would violate Casey’s ban on spousal notification laws. But by
the same token, following Casey in this context would violate basic
principles of due process with respect to the father’s interest. So what
should be done about this conflict? Fittingly enough, the Casey majority
answers that question, too. Indeed, the Casey majority addressed the
principle of stare decisis, which requires a court to follow precedent, and
stated that “[t]he obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity,
and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.”11 The Court cautioned,
however, that precedent should be followed unless and until “a different
necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to
be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason
doomed.”12
For fathers in the abortion context, the “error” of Casey is that its
enforcement may now “doom” their constitutional right to due process of
law. This Note thus argues that, for the very reasons the Casey Court said
9. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (“[Section] 3209 . . . will operate as a substantial obstacle
to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion. It is an undue burden, and therefore invalid.”);
Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (striking a spousal consent statute
as an impermissible restriction on abortion rights).
10. The Due Process Clause only protects individuals from deprivations by the State. E.g.,
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982). In the abortion context, public hospitals
that perform abortions would be considered state actors against whom a father could bring his
claim. More generally, state laws that allow for deprivations of property without due process can
meet the requirements for state action. See, e.g., Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96 (holding that two state
statutes “work[ed as] a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny
the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor” by the
State); Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking a state
statute that allowed a public hospital to remove a deceased’s body parts without the kin’s consent
or notice). Discussion of state actors is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on the
theoretical implications of a father’s property interest in embryos and assumes a state actor in this
context.
11. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
12. Id.
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that precedent should be reexamined, the Supreme Court should
reexamine Casey.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMBRYOS
The post-Casey conflict between a mother’s abortion right and a
father’s due process right is based on embryos being recognized as
“property.” But not all courts agree with this notion. The property/person
dichotomy regarding the legal status of human embryos is one that
continues to be debated,13 especially since how the law defines human
embryos has significant implications.14 For example, the embryo’s status
as property could mean fathers are entitled to due process in the case of a
possible abortion, whereas the embryo’s status as a person would confer
upon it a right to life that is primary, and its destruction would constitute
a homicide.15 Either scenario would conflict with the mother’s abortion
right in some respect. Deeming embryos property, however, may entail a
lesser threat to abortion rights. This consideration perhaps explains why
many lower courts have extended the embryos-as-property notion.16
Regardless of the reasons courts have deemed embryos property instead
of persons, examining the contexts where courts have done so is
important for understanding this conflict.

13. The moral, philosophical, and public policy concerns about deeming human embryos
as property and the reasons for doing so are beyond the scope of this Note. This Note focuses only
on the implications those cases have for fathers in the abortion context.
14. Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical Examination of the Resolution of
Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 396–97
(2005) (“[S]hould [a] court determine that the embryo is human life, its authority to direct the
destruction of the embryo will be significantly limited. By contrast, a determination that the
embryo is purely property provides the court and the progenitors with more latitude in arriving at
possible options for disposition of the embryo.”).
15. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973) (stating that if “personhood is
established, the appellant’s case [a woman seeking an abortion], of course, collapses, for the fetus’
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment”); see also Casey, 505 U.S.
at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that without the status of
“person,” a fetus would not have a “right to life”); Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny,
Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 205
(1997) (“If the law deems frozen embryos ‘persons,’ their damage would constitute criminal or
tort assault, their destruction would be homicide . . . .”).
16. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 403 (“The legal status of ‘personhood’ would also arguably
give the embryo its own protected rights. This could possibly have the effect of outlawing, or at
least rendering impractical, the work of most IVF clinics. For these reasons, no other jurisdiction
has adopted the approach followed by the Louisiana Legislature and characterized embryos as
‘persons.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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A. Problems Involving Leftover Embryos
Science sometimes develops faster than the law. This is particularly
true of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), principally in vitro
fertilization (IVF), which enables people to have children who otherwise
cannot.17 However, the widespread use of ART has provoked unintended
consequences that have raised difficult legal questions—chiefly, what is
the legal status of the human embryo?
Although ART provides more people with the opportunity to conceive
children, its use invites certain problems. Take IVF, for example. It
presents health risks for patients18 and is very expensive.19 To deal with
these concerns, IVF patients often create and keep multiple embryos
frozen through a process known as cryopreservation.20 This technique
increases parents’ overall chances of a successful live birth by allowing
for more than one embryo to be used, minimizes health risks by reducing
the invasiveness inherent in the procedure, and reduces the procedure’s
costs.21 As a result, however, once an IVF patient successfully becomes
pregnant, she will often have leftover embryos that are then stored and
kept frozen indefinitely.22 Recent studies estimate there are over half a
million cryopreserved embryos stored in the United States.23
17. See In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (June 27, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.
org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/basics/why-its-done/prc-2001 8905?p=1.
18. See id.
19. The national average costs for an IVF procedure is about $12,000; however, it jumps to
about $20,000 once other necessary costs are added. See Jennifer Gerson Uffalussy, The Cost of
IVF: 4 Things I Learned While Battling Infertility, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2014, 3:00 PM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2014/02/06/the-cost-of-ivf-4-things-i-learned-whilebattling-infertility/.
20. See Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Note, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative
Rights Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1381–
82 (1995).
21. See DEP’T OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER MED. CTR., IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION (2015), https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/MediaLibraries/URMCMedia/fertilitycenter/documents/In-Vito-Fertilization-4-29-15-updated.pdf.
22. See Laura Biel, What Happens to Extra Embryos After IVF?, CNN.COM (Sept. 2, 2009,
12:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/extra.ivf.embryos/ (explaining that
parents may have up to six leftover embryos after successfully having a child through IVF).
Although embryos can be stored indefinitely, facilities charge between $300 and $1,200 a year to
store embryos. Tamar Lewin, Industry’s Growth Leads to Leftover Embryos, and Painful Choices,
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/embryos-egg-donorsdifficult-issues.html?_r=0.
23. E.g., Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A
Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 378 (2013); Liza Mundy, Souls on Ice:
America’s Embryo Glut and the Wasted Promise of Stem Cell Research, MOTHER JONES
(July 2006), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-ice-americas-embryo-glut-andwasted-promise-stem-cell-research (calculating, based on a 2002 study, that there are over
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Dealing with the growing population of leftover embryos is
problematic because they have a vague status in the law. Given the
embryos’ unclear legal status, those involved with an IVF procedure—
couples, doctors, and IVF clinics—are left in the dark, not knowing how
to deal with the leftover embryos. This uncertainty raises difficult
questions that have no clear answers: Should the clinic keep the embryos
in storage indefinitely?24 Can the clinic donate the embryos? If the clinic
negligently damages or loses the embryos, or simply refuses to return
them,25 can the parents sue the clinic? On what legal grounds might they
do so? Tort? Loss of property? 26 Can the parents seek criminal charges
against the clinic for kidnapping or homicide?27 The answers to these
questions each depend on the embryos’ legal status.28
These difficult questions illustrate why it is important to define an
embryo’s legal status, so as to give parties involved with IVF, and ART
generally, an understanding of their rights in the embryos and what
liabilities and dangers they face. Courts deal directly with this issue when,
for example, couples with leftover embryos seek a divorce,29 when one
who owns frozen reproductive material dies,30 or when a couple reclaims
its embryos from a clinic but the clinic refuses to return them31 or has
destroyed, donated, or lost them.32
500,000 frozen embryos in the United States). There is such an excess of frozen embryos that the
government has a campaign to spread awareness of their availability for adoption. See Embryo
Adoption, OFF. POPULATION AFF., http://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa-and-initiatives/embryoadoption/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
24. IVF clinics would be required to keep the embryos in storage indefinitely if embryos
are granted personhood status. If the embryo is defined as a person, the disposing of the embryos
would constitute homicide and the IVF enterprise would likely be outlawed or rendered
impractical. See Upchurch, supra note 14, at 403 & n.44 (“This [personhood] status could hamper
the work of IVF clinics because it could require IVF clinics to provide storage for the embryos
indefinitely. Also, the IVF clinic could arguably be subject to lawsuits brought by the guardians
of the embryos if the embryo is damaged, wrongfully implanted in another person, or disposed of
by the clinic.”).
25. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 423–25 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that a clinic must
return a couple’s embryos under bailment law).
26. See Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9–
10 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002) (allowing a plaintiff to advance an argument for recovery for
damages for emotional distress based on the loss of irreplaceable property).
27. See Guzman, supra note 15, at 205.
28. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 396 (“Under an adversarial model, the court must assign a
legal status to the embryo. Such a determination is imperative, as it will determine the progenitors’
and the court’s authority over the embryo and dictate the possible options for resolution of the
dispute.”).
29. E.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 177 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
589 (Tenn. 1992); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 264 (Wash. 2002).
30. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
31. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 423–25 (E.D. Va. 1989).
32. See Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784, at *1–
2 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002).
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These ordinary, real-life situations often provoke ligation that requires
courts to decide an embryo’s legal status to resolve the dispute. Doing so,
however, puts courts in an uncomfortable position. Courts have
inconsistently defined the legal statuses of embryos,33 and in fact the
determination may invite moral and philosophical considerations that go
well beyond their expertise.34 Yet, for better or worse, some courts have
tended to apply property law in cases involving reproductive materials
and cryogenically preserved embryos.
B. Sperm as Property
Courts have recognized a property interest in one’s own genetic and
reproductive material.35 A principal case is Hecht v. Superior Court,36 in
which Mr. Kane, the decedent, had deposited fifteen vials of his sperm at
a California sperm bank.37 There he signed a “Specimen Storage
Agreement” giving his partner, Ms. Hecht, control over the sperm in the
event of his death.38 A few days later, Mr. Kane executed a will
bequeathing all “right, title, and interest” in the sperm to Ms. Hecht and
wrote a letter stating his desire that Ms. Hecht use the sperm to become
pregnant, should she so choose.39 Several weeks later, Mr. Kane sent a
letter to both his actual and potential children (those who would be born
from his sperm) declaring his love and affection for them.40 A week after
penning the letter, he committed suicide.41

33. See Guzman, supra note 15, at 197 (discussing the confusing and inconsistent legal
framework surrounding the rights and status of frozen reproductive material); see also Upchurch,
supra note 14, at 397 (“While the adversarial model promotes such determinations, courts have
been unable to articulate a status for the embryo that provides for a workable solution to the
dispute while simultaneously preserving respect for the unique attributes of the embryo.”).
34. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (“We need not resolve the difficult question
of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of
man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”); Dehmel, supra note 20, at
1378 (arguing that when courts determine whose wishes should prevail in cases involving the
disposition of frozen embryos, they must consider questions that, “[f]ar from the detached
methods of science which necessitate them . . . , spawn highly charged inquiries into complex
legal, philosophical, and emotional issues”).
35. See generally Jennifer Long Collins, Note, Hecht v. Superior Court: Recognizing a
Property Right in Reproductive Material, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 661, 662–63 (1995)
(analyzing the Hecht decision and reasons for recognizing property rights in sperm).
36. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
37. Id. at 276.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 276–77.
40. Id. at 277.
41. Id.
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After the suicide, Ms. Hecht and Mr. Kane’s children fought over Mr.
Kane’s frozen sperm.42 The children requested that the sperm be
destroyed or, alternatively, that it be distributed to them.43 They argued
that they wished to “guard the family unit” by preventing the birth of
children who would never meet their father or “have the slightest hope of
being raised in a traditional family,” and they wanted to “prevent the
disruption of [their] existing famil[y],” which would suffer “additional
emotional, psychological and financial stress.”44 Ms. Hecht responded
that neither the estate nor the children had a property interest in the sperm,
because it was gifted to her at the time that it was deposited in the sperm
bank as either an inter vivos gift or a gift causa mortis.45
California’s Second District Court of Appeal agreed with Ms. Hecht
and ruled in her favor.46 The court stated the law provided the decedent
with a transferrable property right.47 The court found that
at the time of [Mr. Kane’s] death, decedent had an interest,
in the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decision
making authority as to the sperm within the scope of policy
set by law. Thus, decedent had an interest in his sperm which
falls within the broad definition of property in Probate Code
section 62, as “anything that may be the subject of ownership
and includes both real and personal property and any interest
therein.”48
Accordingly, the court recognized a valid property interest in
Mr. Kane’s sperm and held it was properly part of his estate.49
By recognizing ownership rights to human genetic material, the Hecht
decision essentially extended personal property rights to human
reproductive material and in so doing rejected public policy concerns
about ownership of human reproductive material.50 And although Hecht
may be viewed as a drastic decision by some,51 perhaps more far-reaching
are cases that have recognized property rights in human embryos.

42. Id. at 278.
43. Id. at 278–79.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 280, 291.
47. Id. at 281.
48. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
49. See id. at 283, 291.
50. See id. at 280–81.
51. But cf. Collins, supra note 35, at 673 (stating that the Hecht decision simply clarified
existing law).
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C. Embryos as Property
York v. Jones52 was one of the first cases to find a property interest in
an embryo. In that case, a married couple, the Yorks, contracted to
undergo IVF to help them have a child.53 Soon after this, the Yorks
decided to move to California.54 Before moving, they requested that their
embryos, which were being kept at the Jones Institute in Virginia, be
transferred to a California clinic so that they could complete the IVF
procedure there.55 However, the Jones Institute refused to send the Yorks’
embryos to California.56 The Yorks then sued the Jones Institute,
claiming they were entitled to the embryos.57
Applying bailment law, the court found the clinic, as a bailee, had a
duty to return the embryos to the Yorks as they were the rightful owners.58
Moreover, the court also found the “plaintiffs ha[d] properly alleged a
cause of action in detinue,” which requires, among other things, “a
property interest in the thing sought to be recovered . . . .”59
In short, the York court, without explicitly defining the embryos as
property, found a property interest in human embryos by applying
bailment law—a common law property principle. And by applying
property law, the court recognized the Yorks indeed had an ownership
interest in their embryos.60 Therefore, York plainly recognized a personal
property interest in human embryos.61
Discussion of York’s implications and the person/property embryo
dichotomy is abundant.62 For instance, Professor Angela Upchurch
explains that York’s finding of a property interest in embryos was not too
shocking given that IVF consent forms often contain divorce provisions
that characterize the embryos as the “marital property” of the parents.63
52. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
53. Id. at 423–24.
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id. at 424.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 422–24.
58. Id. at 425.
59. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
60. See id. at 425.
61. See id. at 425–27.
62. See, e.g., Upchurch, supra note 14, at 396–97, 401; see also Jessica Berg, Owning
Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
159, 207–08 (2005) (arguing courts are applying a property framework to disputes over embryos,
even though they are unwilling to frame the arguments in those terms); Guzman, supra note 15,
at 197–98 (noting the disparate ways embryos are characterized across disciplines); Shelly R.
Petralia, Note, Resolving Disputes over Excess Frozen Embryos Through the Confines of Property
and Contract Law, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 106 (2002–2003) (discussing the ways courts attempt
to frame the issue in embryo-dispute cases).
63. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 401.
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These consent forms, therefore, demonstrate that the York position is
shared—or at least comprehended—by those who undergo IVF.
Professor Upchurch, however, also cautions that characterizing
embryos as property would imply embryo disputes should be resolved
using traditional contract and property law principles.64 She claims this
characterization would render irrelevant any argument that parties have
interests in the embryo because of their potential to become born
persons.65 Professor Upchurch maintains some courts are unwilling to
label embryos as property for that reason.66 Yet, despite these concerns,
many courts have done exactly that.
Another case that explicitly deemed embryos property was Frisina v.
Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island.67 There, a couple sued a
hospital for “loss of irreplaceable property,” claiming that the hospital
had destroyed their embryos.68 However, the hospital moved for
summary judgment arguing in part that there was no precedent in Rhode
Island allowing the award of damages “for emotional distress from the
loss of [embryo] property based on breach of contract or negligence.”69
The court explained that “while courts have not considered preembryos persons within the meaning of the law, they have been deemed
‘property’ of progenitors,” or the progenitors are deemed to at least have
an ownership-like interest in the embryos.70 Accordingly, the court found
“merit in the argument raised by plaintiffs that recovery for damages for
emotional distress based on the ‘loss of irreplaceable property,’ the loss
of their pre-embryos, [was] permissible” and denied summary judgment
on that claim.71
The Frisnia and York cases plainly recognized the parents’ property
interest in human embryos.72 They were not distinct in this regard; they
were simply more explicit. But not all embryo ownership cases overtly
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Howell, supra note 6, at 414 (“The majority of commentators and courts
subscribe to or at least pay lip service to a conceptual middle ground between viewing the frozen
embryo as human and viewing the frozen embryo as mere property. Most contend that the frozen
embryo is an entity ‘entitle[d] . . . to special respect’ because it represents potential life. It is
difficult, however, to define respect in this context.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992))).
67. No. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002).
68. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. at *8.
70. Id. at *9 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421,
425 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
71. Id. at *10 (emphasis added).
72. See Howell, supra note 6, at 413–14 (“The court in York v. Jones applied the property
approach . . . [by holding] that the clinic acted as bailee of the property and was under a legal duty
to return it to the rightful owners.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
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recognize such interests.73 Some courts are apprehensive about deeming
embryos property and tend instead to recognize embryo ownership—
either treating the embryo as property deserving “special respect” or
implying ownership by applying contract law.74
D. Embryos as “Property-Like”
75

Davis v. Davis is an example of a court hesitating to call embryos
property but nevertheless recognizing the parents’ ownership interest in
the embryos.76 There, a Tennessee couple used IVF to create seven
cryopreserved embryos.77 The couple later divorced, which led them to
litigate over the custody rights to the embryos.78 Mrs. Davis wanted to
keep the embryos for herself in order to have children, but Mr. Davis
wanted to keep the embryos stored because he was undecided about
whether he wanted to be an unwed parent.79
At trial, Mrs. Davis was awarded custody of the embryos.80 In turn,
Mr. Davis appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision
and ruled in favor of Mr. Davis, finding Mr. Davis had a constitutionally
protected right not to have a child “where no pregnancy has taken
place.”81 Disagreeing with that decision, Mrs. Davis appealed to the
Tennessee Supreme Court, which granted review.82
The Tennessee Supreme Court found that Mr. Davis was entitled to
custody of the embryos.83 By referring to The American Fertility
Society’s ethical standards, the court reasoned that the legal status of
embryos “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect” and thus lie somewhere between property and human life.84
Accordingly, the Court determined that Mr. and Mrs. Davis’s interest in
their embryos was “not a true property interest . . . , [but that] they do
have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have
decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos.”85

73. Courts are often uncomfortable with treating human embryos as mere property and
often describe it falling within a middle ground between property and a human life. See id. at 414.
74. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
75. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
76. See id. at 597–98.
77. Id. at 589.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 590.
83. See id. at 604.
84. Id. at 596–97.
85. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
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Interestingly, the Davis court tiptoed around the question of whether
embryos are mere property by stating that the embryos deserve “special
respect” and that the Davises did not have a “true property interest” in
them.86 Still, putting the “special respect” language to the side, the Davis
court nevertheless recognized the Davises had an interest in the
ownership of the embryos and thereby recognized a property—or at least
a “property-like”87—interest in human embryos. Indeed, Professor
Upchurch explains that, although Davis and other cases88 put embryos in
this “property-like” middle category between property and human life, in
reality those cases treat the embryos like property to resolve the dispute.89
Therefore, Davis and cases applying the property-like category show
another way that courts have recognized a property interest in embryos.
E. Embryo Ownership Enforced by Contract
A third way that courts recognize a property interests in embryos is by
contract. In Kass v. Kass,90 for instance, a married couple signed consent

86. Id.; see also Upchurch, supra note 14, at 401 & n.31 (stating that “courts are reluctant
to characterize embryos as mere property under the law”).
87. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 404–05 (explaining that Davis and cases like it “support[]
the view of the embryo as property-like” because they treat “the embryo more as property than as
a person” by allowing for them to be donated for research and by allowing “the progenitors [to]
freely contract for sole control over the embryo” (emphasis added)).
88. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“[P]re-embryos
occupy an interim category between mere human tissue and persons because of their potential to
become persons. Accordingly, such embryos are due varying degrees of special respect dependent
on the issue involved.” (emphasis added)).
89. See Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39
CONN. L. REV. 2107, 2123 & n.102 (2007) (“In acknowledging the progenitors ownership interests
and ability to dispose of the embryo in any manner consistent with the law, the court in Davis,
ultimately treated the embryo like property despite holding it was entitled to special respect.”);
see also Berg, supra note 62, at 211–12 (“Although it may seem tempting to talk about these
entities as if they are neither persons nor property but a new special category, such terminology
does little by itself to advance the legal analysis or provide a helpful framework for evaluation. In
fact, the courts that seem to choose this route merely note the embryo’s ‘special’ status, but then
revert to precepts of property law to resolve the dispute.” (footnote omitted)); Beth E. Roxland &
Arthur Caplan, Should Unclaimed Frozen Embryos Be Considered Abandoned Property and
Donated to Stem Cell Research?, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 108, 115 (2015) (“Even where a court
makes explicit statements regarding the status of the embryo (i.e., person, property or entity
deserving of special respect), there is often a disconnect between the court’s general
characterization of embryos and the ordered disposition of the embryos at issue. Several opinions
that initially declare it inappropriate to categorize embryos as property ultimately order that the
embryos be thawed or destroyed in the course of research—remedies that arguably treat the
embryos more like property than persons.”).
90. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
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forms to undergo IVF.91 They later sought a divorce.92 Before deciding
to divorce, however, the couple had unsuccessfully tried IVF nine times
and had five leftover cryopreserved pre-zygotes.93 Like the couple in
Davis, Mrs. Kass wanted the right to use these pre-zygotes in another IVF
procedure while Mr. Kass did not.94 This disagreement sparked litigation
over the rights to the pre-zygotes.95
Ultimately, the court denied the pre-zygotes personhood status and
upheld the signed IVF consent forms.96 The court explained that one
approach to deciding the issue is to “regard the progenitors as holding a
‘bundle of rights’ in relation to the pre-zygote that can be exercised
through joint disposition agreements.”97 Here, the agreement provided
that the embryos would be donated to an IVF program if the parties could
not agree on the disposition of the zygotes.98 So, to resolve the case, the
court enforced the contract and let Mr. Kass donate the embryos to an
IVF research program.99
Kass shows that the existence of a contract allows courts to punt on
the issue of whether embryos are property, property-like and entitled to
“special respect,” or persons. Given the existence of a written agreement,
a court may simply enforce the contract, thus implying ownership rights
in the embryos that allow for their donation.100
Litowitz v. Litowitz101 provides yet another example of a court
upholding a contract implying embryo ownership.102 In this case, a
married couple received eggs from a donor.103 The couple fertilized the
eggs with the husband’s sperm to create five pre-embryos.104 After the
birth of a daughter through a surrogate, the couple was left with two

91. Id. at 176.
92. Id. at 177.
93. Id. at 175–77.
94. Id. at 177.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 179–80.
97. Id. at 179.
98. Id. at 181.
99. Id.; see also Berg, supra note 62, at 161 (“[Kass] rejected the ‘interim category’
approach and stated that progenitors hold a ‘bundle of rights’ in their frozen embryos.” (footnote
omitted)).
100. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182; see also Upchurch, supra note 89, at 2124 (arguing that
although the Kass court attempted to avoid “the morass of confusion” regarding the legal status
of an embryo, it nonetheless “implicitly gave the disputed embryo a property-like status”).
101. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
102. Id. at 273–74.
103. Id. at 262.
104. Id.
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cryopreserved embryos.105 They later divorced,106 after which the ex-wife
sought to “implant the remaining preembryos in a surrogate mother and
bring them to term.”107 The ex-husband did not want to have a child with
her and instead wanted to put the embryos up for adoption.108 This
disagreement spilled into the courtroom.109
The court acknowledged that the husband and wife had equal rights to
the pre-embryos—even though the wife was not a progenitor of the preembryos like in Kass or Davis—due to the donor contract.110 The court,
however, looked solely to the cryopreservation contract the couple signed
and ordered the pre-embryos thawed and disposed of in accordance with
the contract.111 In deciding the case by interpreting the contractual
agreement, the court avoided the “legal, medical or philosophical
discussion [about] whether the preembryos in this case are ‘children’” or
not.112 By referring only to contract and property principles, the ruling
supports Professor Upchurch’s claim that deeming embryos property
allows courts to mechanically apply common law principles to embryo
ownership disputes without giving significance to the embryos’ potential
to be born persons.113
As with the property-like category, Professor Upchurch maintains the
“resolution of the embryo dispute under principles of contract law
necessitates a property-based view of the legal status of the embryo.”114
The reason for this, she argues, is that parents cannot contract away child
visitation rights if the agreement is not in the child’s best interest, but
potential parents can contract for one parent to receive sole control of an
embryo or for an embryo to be donated for research. Moreover, courts do
not oversee the disposition of the embryos the way they oversee child
custody agreements.115 These differences demonstrate that courts treat
embryos like property in order to enforce contracts.116
105. Id. at 262–63.
106. Id. at 264.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 267.
111. Id. at 271.
112. Id.
113. See supra Section II.C.
114. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 406; see also Alexia M. Baiman, Cryopreserved Embryos
as America's Prospective Adoptees: Are Couples Truly “Adopting” or Merely Transferring
Property Rights?, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 134 n.7 (2009) (“In order for genetic
parents to lawfully contract away their ownership rights to their embryos, the excess
cryopreserved embryos must first be deemed to be their property. If embryos are deemed to be
property rather than legally recognized ‘persons,’ either contract or property law could govern the
transfer.”).
115. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 405.
116. Id. at 406.
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F. Embryo Property in the Abortion Context
These cases establish that human embryos can be owned. Some cases
demonstrate this by explicitly applying property law,117 others by
acknowledging property-like interests,118 and others by applying contract
law.119 Ultimately, these cases acknowledge an ownership-like interest in
embryos—particularly on behalf of those whose genetic material created
the embryos.
Under this case law, a father, as a progenitor, has a proprietary interest
in an embryo. Thus, a father who wants to protect himself from being
deprived of this property via an abortion should be entitled to the due
process rights that the Constitution promises him. A challenge in such a
case, however, is that in the abortion context courts might be
apprehensive to extend property rights to an embryo in vivo, i.e., one
inside the womb. But distinguishing embryos in vitro from those in vivo
would be problematic.
First, courts finding that progenitors have a property interest in their
embryos did not do so because of where the embryos were located; rather,
those courts recognized the progenitors’ property interest in the embryos
because the embryos contained their genetic material. Second, due to the
person/property dichotomy, granting property status to an embryo in vitro
but not to an embryo in vivo inevitably invites granting the in vivo
embryo personhood status—something courts have avoided as it would
call into question the legality of abortion altogether. Third, as discussed
in Part III, the Due Process Clause may protect a proprietary interest
despite embryos not being recognized as property by state law. For these
reasons, courts may be unwilling to distinguish between embryos in vitro
and embryos in vivo; moreover, such a distinction is not determinative of
whether embryos are property for the purposes of due process. In sum, a
father in the abortion context, especially in jurisdictions that deem
embryos property, should be entitled to a proprietary interest in an
embryo in vivo, and that property interest entitles him to constitutional
due process rights.
III. PROPERTY AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution protect people from being deprived of their “life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”120 As mentioned above, due
117. See supra Section II.B.
118. See supra Section II.C.
119. See supra Section II.D.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.1 (5th ed. 2012).
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process has procedural and substantive elements. Procedural due process
protects people against state deprivations121 of life, liberty, or property by
requiring “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.”122
However, a prerequisite for due process protection with regard to
property is demonstrating the existence of a “property” interest
recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.123 In
fact, only certain types of “property” are protected under the Due Process
Clause. Thus, to qualify for due process protection of property, a person
must have the type of property the Constitution protects. In the due
process context, however, the concept of property can be quite broad.
A. “Property” Under the Due Process Clause
“[T]he property interests protected by procedural due process extend
well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”124 The
Supreme Court made this clear in Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, when it established that the Due Process Clause protects “property”
interests derived from independent sources such as state law.125 Roth
involved a state university professor who sued the school for not rehiring
him,126 claiming the school’s decision not to rehire him violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right by depriving him of property without due
process of law.127
121. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
122. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950). The legendary
Justice Story, describing due process rights (although in the criminal context), stated that “[i]t is
a rule, founded in the first principles of natural justice, that a party shall have an opportunity to
be heard in his defence [sic] before his property is condemned . . . . If a seizure is made . . . so that
the parties in interest have no opportunity of appearing and making a defence [sic], the sentence
is not so much a judicial sentence, as an arbitrary sovereign edict.” Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co.,
3 F. Cas. 1184, 1187 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 434 (1982) (“[T]he State may not finally destroy a property interest without first giving the
putative owner an opportunity to present his claim of entitlement.”); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93
U.S. 274, 280–81 (1876) (quoting Justice Story’s opinion in Bradstreet).
123. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885,
886 (2000); see also Robert Michael Kline, Comment, Constitutional Law: Is There a Protected
Interest in Protection (or Are Court Orders Merely Suggestions)?, 58 FLA. L. REV. 459, 460
(2006) (“[T]he first element of a procedural due process claim that alleges a deprivation of
property is the identification of a property interest. In cases involving tangible property, a property
interest is usually easy to ascertain. When the property interest is not readily identifiable, however,
procedural due process cases become more complicated.” (footnotes omitted)).
124. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972).
125. Id. at 577.
126. Id. at 566.
127. Id. at 568–69.
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The Court explained that “[t]he requirements of procedural due
process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”128
Therefore, one must claim a deprivation of a “liberty” or “property”
interest for the Due Process Clause to apply.129 The Court defined a
property interest by stating:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it . . . [and]
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law—rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus welfare
recipients ha[ve] a claim of entitlement to welfare payments
that [are] grounded in the statute defining eligibility for
them. . . .130
As such, the Court clarified that as a welfare recipient’s “property”
interest in welfare payments is created by statutory terms, the professor’s
“property” interest in his employment was created by the terms of his
appointment.131 The Court thus recognized that the professor did in fact
have a “property” interest in his employment, which was protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.132 However, because
the terms of the professor’s employment agreement automatically
expired on a specific date, and did not provide for a renewal, he did not
have an interest in his future employment and was thus not deprived of
his property interest under the Due Process Clause.133
Recently, the Supreme Court in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales134
reaffirmed Roth’s definition of property but also added:

128. Id. at 569.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 577.
131. Id. at 578.
132. Id. at 578–79.
133. Id.; see also 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, § 17.5(a) (“A person has an
entitlement-property interest in employment with the government if he has already received the
position and applicable law guarantees him continued employment. However, . . . if one occupies
a position that applicable law defines as terminable for any reason, that person can be discharged
without the requirement of fair procedures.” (footnote omitted)).
134. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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Th[e] determination [of property interests protected by the
Due Process Clause], despite its state-law underpinnings, is
ultimately one of federal constitutional law. “Although the
underlying substantive interest is created by ‘an independent
source such as state law,’ federal constitutional law
determines whether that interest rises to the level of a
‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due
Process Clause.”135
Therefore, Gonzales allows for property interests to be recognized
under the Due Process Clause even if those interests would not be
recognized as property under state law.136 In other words, what is
considered property under the Due Process clause can, but need not be,
considered property under state law.
Consistent with Gonzales and Roth, in the abortion context a father’s
interest in his embryo could be protected under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of whether the state law defines
his interest as one of property. As a matter of constitutional law, federal
law—not state law—determines what interests are protected as property
under the Fourteenth Amendment.137 Examples of this principle include
cases finding Fourteenth Amendment property interests in one’s public
employment138 and in one’s deceased child’s body parts,139 even though
state law did not clearly define those interests as “property.”
Accordingly, although only some jurisdictions explicitly consider
parents’ interest in their embryo to be one of mere property while other
jurisdictions deem it “property-like,” either scenario may entitle a father
to due process rights. As long as state law, case law, or a court recognizes
a father’s interest in his embryo as “property” under the Due Process
Clause, then he has a right to not be deprived of his interest without due
process of law.140
B. Property Rights to a Deceased Kin’s Body Parts
A good example of due process rights attaching to an interest not
regarded as “property” under state law—and that also involved rights to
human material—is provided in the case of Newman v.
Sathyavaglswaran.141 In brief, the Ninth Circuit held that parents had a
135. Id. at 756–57 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576–77.
139. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2002).
140. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 756–57.
141. 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
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property interest in their deceased children’s body parts.142 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit found “next of kin” property interests are afforded
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.143
The facts of Newman involved parents who sued the coroner’s office
for removing their deceased children’s corneas without providing them
notice or asking for their consent after the children died.144 It was
uncontested that the coroner’s actions were a deprivation under the laws
of the state,145 but in his defense, the coroner argued the parents could not
bring a due process claim because they did not have a property interest in
their children’s bodies.146
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reiterated Roth’s language, holding
procedural due process protects property interests well beyond actual
ownership of real estate or chattels and protects the “security of interest”
already acquired.147 The court then looked to determine whether the
coroner had deprived the parents of a property interest they, as parents,
had acquired over their children’s bodies and whether that interest was
protected under the Due Process Clause.148 To do so, the court defined
property as “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.”149
Applying this definition of property, the Newman court found the
parents, as next of kin, had a due process property interest in their
deceased children’s bodies.150 And by removing the deceased children’s
body parts and transferring them to others, “the coroner did not merely
‘take a single “strand” from the “bundle” of property rights: it chop[ped]
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand[,]’ [which] was a
deprivation of the most certain variety.”151 Accordingly, the court held
that the coroner deprived the Newmans of property without due process
of law.152 In effect, the Ninth Circuit protected a property interest—here,
142. Id. at 798.
143. Id. at 797–99.
144. Id. at 788.
145. Id. at 789.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 790.
148. Id. at 795.
149. Id. (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). The court
further relied on Roth, stating a person must have more than an ‘“abstract need or desire,”’ but
rather must have a ‘“legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”’ Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
150. Id. at 796–97.
151. Id. at 798 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1989)).
152. Id.
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in the children’s body parts—under the Fourteenth Amendment even
though that same interest was not deemed property under state law.153
C. A Father’s Due Process Rights in the Abortion Context
These cases demonstrate that an individual’s property is
constitutionally protected from State deprivation under the Due Process
Clause. As shown in Part II, there should be no doubt that embryos have
been deemed property: they have been subject to contract, transfer, and
division as marital property in a divorce.154 Progenitors who have a
property interest in an embryo should thus be entitled to due process
rights.
This proposition is especially true in jurisdictions that explicitly deem
embryos property by precedent, such as in the York and Frisnia cases, or
by statute, since property interests protected by the Due Process Clause
“are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.”155 These jurisdictions have case law establishing a property interest
in embryos, and the Due Process Clause should protect that interest.
Moreover, as Roth and Newman showed, even when a state or its
courts do not recognize a particular interest as property, that interest may
still be recognized as property under the Due Process Clause. The Court
has repeated that, despite the interest’s foundations in state law,
determining whether property interests are protected by the Due Process
Clause is a question of federal constitutional law.156 Therefore, even in
jurisdictions that do not explicitly deem embryos property, and instead
recognize a “property-like” or ownership interest in the embryos, such
that parties may enter into a contract regarding the embryos—or even
where a jurisdiction or state has not considered the issue at all, such as in
Roth and in Newman—parents’ interest in their embryo may still be
recognized as a property interest under the Due Process Clause.
By having a proprietary interest in an embryo, fathers facing an
abortion should be entitled to the due process rights the Constitution
promises them: notice and an opportunity to be heard.157 In the abortion
context, however, fathers are often not notified about, or afforded
opportunity to voice protest against, the destruction of their protected
property interest. But due process demands at least that. The problem is
153. Id. at 789, 797.
154. See supra Part II.
155. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 546, 577 (1972).
156. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005).
157. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating that
notice and hearings “must measure up to the standards of due process”).
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that after the Danforth and Casey decisions,158 abortion statutes cannot
require notice and an opportunity to be heard without being struck down
as unconstitutional undue burdens on the mother’s abortion right.159
Needless to say, even if fathers are constitutionally entitled to due process
rights regarding their property interests in the abortion context, Casey has
made it such that they cannot be given it.
IV. REVISITING THE CONFLICT WITH CASEY
In Casey, the Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania statute
requiring married women to notify their husbands before having an
abortion was unconstitutional.160 The Court reasoned that spousalnotification requirements would deter some women from having an
abortion and thus constitute an “undue burden” on a woman’s exercise of
her abortion right.161 But before striking down spousal notification
requirements, the Court first had to address whether Roe, which
established a woman’s right to an abortion under the “liberty” prong of
the Fourteenth Amendment,162 was still good law.163
A. Overturning Stare Decisis
The Casey majority began its opinion by stating that “[l]iberty finds
no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”164 So to address the doubts about
Roe and the calling for it to be overruled, the Court expounded on the
principle of stare decisis.165 The Court explained that because “no judicial
system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case
that raised it,” stare decisis demands respect for prior cases.166 That is to
say, legal consistency is important if the judicial system is to work for the
benefit of society. At the same time, the Court stressed that following

158. See supra Part I.
159. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (“[Spousal
notification requirements] will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo
an abortion. It is an undue burden, and therefore invalid.”).
160. Id. The statute at issue stated that “no physician shall perform an abortion on a married
woman . . . unless he or she has received a signed statement, which need not be notarized, from
the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse that she
is about to undergo an abortion.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3209(a) (1989). The statute also stated the
statement must contain a notice that false statements are punishable by law. Id.
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54, 164 (1973).
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46.
164. Id. at 843–44.
165. Id. at 853 (“[Doubts about] Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty
we have given combined with the force of stare decisis.” (alteration in original)).
166. Id. at 854.
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precedent is not an “inexorable command.”167 Rather, changes in society
and in the law may require a court to break precedent when “a prior
judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its
enforcement was for that very reason doomed.”168 Thus, a Court must
make “prudential and pragmatic considerations” to determine whether
precedent should be followed.169
The Court listed several factors to be considered in determining
whether to follow precedent.170 One important consideration it listed was
“whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”171
Applying this principle to Roe, the Court then examined medical
advancements that had allowed fetuses to reach viability sooner than was
the case when Roe was decided.172
For the Court, the medical advances since Roe ultimately had “no
bearing on the validity of Roe’s central holding,” as it only changed the
“point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate
to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”173 The Court
reasoned that simply because the State’s interest in a viable fetus
originated sooner in the pregnancy did not, by itself, call into question the
“soundness or unsoundness” of the Roe decision.174 Accordingly, the
Court found there were no changes that rendered Roe’s central holding
obsolete nor any that supported arguments for overruling it.175 But that
may not be the case anymore. Indeed, since the time that the Supreme
Court decided Casey, laws regarding the advancements in reproductive
technologies have significantly changed the legal interests involved in an
abortion.
B. Casey Must Be Reexamined
Facts central to the soundness of Casey’s holding have significantly
changed. A dominant concern in Casey was whether spousal notification
rights are constitutional.176 However, the considerations needed to decide
that question have changed significantly in light of a father’s proprietary
interest in the embryo. As previously discussed, this interest would entitle
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 854–55.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 844, 887.
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him to due process rights in the abortion context. This constitutional right
was not factored into the Casey equation.177
Indeed, the Court did not consider the legal changes allowing for a
father’s potential due process right in the abortion setting. Therefore, the
fathers’ competing right to notice and an opportunity to be heard was
something the Casey Court did not consider. Yet due process rights are
guaranteed in the text of the Constitution, and notice and an opportunity
to be heard are the least that due process requires. So the fact that a father
may have a property interest in the embryo that entitles him to procedural
due process is undoubtedly a significant “fact [that] ha[s] so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.”178 Had the Casey Court considered a father’s
due process right in relation to the pregnancy, the Court would have likely
balanced these competing interests differently.179
Additionally, by balancing the mother’s abortion right against the
state’s interest in the fetus’ potential personhood, the Casey decision
demonstrates that the mother’s right to an abortion is not absolute.180 In
fact, the Court determined that the State’s interest at viability “is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
abortions.”181 Conversely, before a fetus reaches viability, the State’s
interest is deemed subordinate to the mother’s and any restriction on her
abortion right would need to survive the Court’s undue burden test.182
The Court thus struck a balance between the mother’s right and the
State’s interest, and between the father’s interest and the mother’s liberty;
yet the father’s potential due process rights were never placed on the
Court’s scale. If Casey were being decided today, however, the Court
would need to balance each competing interest involved in the abortion.
The Court would thus have to account for the father’s due process right,
which is currently at odds with its previous holding. This development
would give rise to, as the Casey majority put it, a “necessity” to reexamine
the Casey precedent itself because it would otherwise entail maintaining

177. Id. at 895–98 (discussing a husband’s interest in his wife’s pregnancy and the wellbeing of the fetus, but never considering the potential property interests a husband may have in a
developing fetus).
178. Id. at 855.
179. See id. at 898. In discussing the competing interests between husband and wife, the
Court describes the husband’s interest as one in the “potential life of the child,” while describing
the wife’s interest as one of “liberty,” a constitutionally protected right. Id. If the Court recognized
both interests as constitutionally protected, the balancing test may have garnered a different result.
180. Id. at 876 (“The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads
to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.”).
181. Id. at 860.
182. Id. at 876.
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two Constitutional rights that are currently in contradiction.183 Therefore,
this tension between two constitutional rights robs Casey of “significant
application or justification.”
Lastly, as it stands, the Court has never addressed a father’s
proprietary interest in the fetus. The Casey decision is therefore neither
indicative of whether fathers indeed have due process rights in the
abortion context nor of whether such rights would be subordinate to the
mother’s abortion right. The possibility that fathers are entitled to due
process in the abortion context raises doubts about Casey’s holding that
fathers cannot be required to be given, among other things, notice of an
abortion. And since the Casey Court felt it was necessary to address the
“doubts” surrounding Roe and the statutory restriction of a non-textual
right,184 the Court should have at least equal reasons to address doubts
surrounding Casey and its renunciation of a textual right—a father’s due
process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. But without
reexamining Casey, questions about a father’s due process right and how
it should be balanced against the mother’s abortion right will remain
unanswered. These questions only add to the looming uncertainties
covered in Part II.
Ultimately, the law is trending toward deeming an embryo the
property of its progenitors. As such, fathers should be entitled to due
process rights that protect them from being deprived of property without
due process of law. However, the Casey Court did not consider this or the
resulting tension it created between two constitutionally protected rights.
Given the changes, conflicts, and doubts involving the different interests
and rights that must now be balanced in an abortion, the Supreme Court
must reexamine its holding in Casey to determine whether a father’s
proprietary interest in his embryos entitles him to due process rights and,
if so, what process is due.
CONCLUSION
In sum, as courts, legislatures, and individuals continue to—directly
or indirectly—treat embryos as property, the tension between a mother’s
abortion right and a father’s due process right will only become more
pronounced. And, as this Note has shown, although the Constitution
explicitly states that no person shall be deprived of “property, without
due process of law,”185 until Casey is reexamined, fathers living in the
post-Casey world may suffer exactly that.
183. Id. at 854. As stated above, Casey struck down spousal notification requirements for
abortions but due process rights for a father would constitutionally entitle him to at least notice.
See supra Section III.C.
184. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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